State v. Crotto Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 42993 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-17-2015
State v. Crotto Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 42993
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Crotto Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 42993" (2015). Not Reported. 2223.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2223
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO 










ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-2994 
REPLY BRIEF 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE STEVEN J HIPPLER 
District Judge 
SARA 8. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
JENNY C. SWINFORD 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #9263 
P.O. Box 2816 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




NOV 1 7 2015 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......... '" . ..................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. ...... . . ...................... 1 
Nature of the Case .................................................................................. 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ...................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................... 3 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Crotto's Motion To 
Suppress Because Mr. Crotto's Consent To Search The 
Safe Was Involuntary Based On The Totality Of The 
Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....................... 3 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 6 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ........................................................................... 7 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ............................................. .4 
State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680 (Ct. App. 2011) ......................................... .4 
State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693 (1999) ........................................................ 5 
State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151 (2004) .............................................................. 5 
State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848 (2001) .................................................................. .4 
II 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Marvin Gordon Grotto moved to suppress certain evidence obtained by law 
enforcement after a search of the safe in his bedroom The district court denied his 
motion. Mr. Grotto then entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled 
substance with the intent to deliver. Mr. Grotto now appeals from the district court's 
judgment of conviction, contending the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress because Mr. Grotto's consent to search the safe was involuntary. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously discussed 
in Mr. Grotto's Appellant's Brief. They are not repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
1 
ISSUE 
the district court err by denying Mr. Grotto's motion to suppress when Mr. Grotto's 
to search the safe was involuntary based on the totality of the circumstances? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Grotto's Motion To Suppress Because 
Mr. Grotto's Consent To Search The Safe Was Involuntary Based On The Totality Of 
The Circumstances 
As argued in Mr. Grotto's Appellant's Brief, the district court lacked substantial 
and competent evidence to find Mr. Grotto voluntarily consented to the search of the 
safe in his bedroom. His consent to search was not voluntary, but rather the product of 
police coercion and duress when considering the totality of the circumstances. 
As an initial matter, Mr. Grotto agrees with the State's assertion that he only 
challenges the search of the safe in his bedroom. (Respt. Br., pp.7-8.) This was the 
only issue raised by Mr. Grotto in his motion to suppress. (R., p.68.) The items found by 
Officer Reimers during the search of the safe were drug paraphernalia and 
methamphetamine. (R., p.67.) 
Contrary to the State's arguments, however, Mr. Grotto is entitled to suppression 
of these items because any consent to search the safe was involuntary. ( See Res pt. 
Br. pp.8-16.) Mr. Grotto takes issue with the State's assertion that his argument 
"misstates the district court's decision and the evidence presented at the suppression 
hearing." (Respt. Br. P.9.) Mr. Grotto simply contends that the district court's factual 
findings regarding consent are unsupported by the evidence in the record, especially 
the audio recording of the police investigation. For example, the audio recording shows 
that Mr. Grotto informed the officers of his PSR worker multiple times throughout the 
investigation. (State's Ex. 1, Audio CD ("Audio") 3:31-40, 3:47-55, 03-16, 5:35-39, 
5:42-52, 8:23-35, 11 :45-49, 23:36-39.) Although the quality of the audio recording 
makes it somewhat difficult to identify each and every statement made by Mr. Grotto 
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and the officers, a close listening of the recording reveals Mr. Grotto explicitly informing 
the officers of his PSR worker many times. 
This information provided by the audio recording is significant because the 
district court "must" take into account "subtly coercive police tactics, as well as the 
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents." Schneckloth v. 
Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218,229 (1973); accord, e.g., State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848,852 
(2001 ); State v. Linenberger, 151 Idaho 680, 686 (Ct. App. 2011 ). Here, the district 
court's discussion of Mr. Grotto's PSR worker demonstrates that the district court did not 
properly consider the evidence of Mr. Grotto's vulnerable subjective state. The district 
court determined Mr. Grotto's reference to his PSR worker was intended to explain 
away the officers' allegations of criminal activity. (R., pp.72-73.) The district court also 
determined Mr. Grotto's "ready response" demonstrated "considerable sophistication" 
and an understanding of the situation. (R., p.72.) The error in the district court's finding 
is that the district court failed to place this single reference to the PSR worker in context 
of the entire investigation, which is necessary for a totality of the circumstances 
analysis. It does not "strain credulity," as asserted by the State, to argue "the district 
court's finding that Mr. Grotto referenced his PSR one time to explain away the 
anonymous tip is clearly erroneous." (Respt. Br., p.1 0; App. Br., pp.16-17.) The district 
court discussed one reference to a PSR worker. (R., pp.72-73.) Its recitation of the 
facts also provides this single reference. (R., pp.64-68.) But, when listening to the audio 
recording as a whole, it is clear that Mr. Grotto made multiple references to PSR 
worker-not to mention the others statements by Mr. Grotto and his friend-to express 
a lack of comprehension and duress in the situation. The district court made no specific 
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mention of these other statements. Nor did the district court consider how these other 
statements factored into Mr. Grotto's "possibly vulnerable subjective state" when he 
consented to the search of the safe. The district court lacked substantial and competent 
evidence for its findings on Mr. Grotto's mental health condition and how his condition 
affected the voluntariness of his consent 
What is more, the officers' testimony does not bolster any finding by the district 
court on Mr. Grotto's subjective state. (See Respt. Br., pp.12-13, 14-15.) For example, 
the nervousness and anxiety of Mr. Grotto, which was understood by the officers as an 
indication of illegal activity, is equally indicative of duress and coercion. As an inquiry 
into Mr. Grotto's subjective state, Mr. Grotto's statements on the audio recording should 
be given more weight than the objective perceptions of the officers. 
Mr. Grotto also takes issue with the State's contention that his argument 
regarding revocation of consent is "illogical." (Respt. Br., p.15.) Mr. Grotto is not arguing 
that he preemptively revoked consent to search the safe before he gave that consent. 
Rather, he is arguing that the officers' disregard of his attempts to revoke his consent is 
further evidence of the coercion and duress present when Mr. Grotto eventually gave in 
to the search of the safe. The evidence shows Mr. Grotto tried to withdraw his consent 
to search his home and bedroom. (Audio 6:17-43, 8:15-54, 13:58-14:06, 17:53-18:28.) 
A typical reasonable person would have understood that Mr. Grotto wanted the officers 
to end the search and leave his home by these exchanges. State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 
151, 154 (2004); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 696 (1999). The officers did not leave 
Mr. Grotto's home, however. The officers just continued to ask Mr. Grotto to consent to 
the search until they got the answer they wanted. Mr. Grotto's attempts at revocation 
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further demonstrate that the district court lacked substantial and competent evidence to 
that Mr. Grotto's consent to search the safe was voluntary. 
The State submits that the district court properly concluded: 
[A]lthough police undoubtedly used sharp investigative tactics in order to 
coax the defendant into consenting to the search of his bedroom safe, the 
officers never strayed beyond the confines of the law (i.e. by coercing the 
defendant's consent) in doing so, and hence the motion to suppress must 
be denied. 
(Respt. Br., pp.15-16; R., p.69.) Mr. Grotto disagrees. An officer's use of sharp 
investigative tactics to coax a mentally-impaired and distressed individual to consent 
after his repeated, but ignored, attempts at revocation is not within the confines of the 
law. It is implied coercion. Mr. Grotto's consent was involuntary and thus the search of 
the safe was unlawful. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Crotto respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's denial 
of his motion to suppress. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the district court's order and remand his case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 17th day of November, 2015. 
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